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IN THE SUPREME COURT.OF

INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION,
INC., a Nevada Corporation,
and PRITCHETT CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Joint Venture,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
vs.

_,J:

STATE OF UTAH, by and . · ·-., < ·,.
thr~ the DEPARTQN1 OE'~,.
TRANSPORTATION,
. "· •__.,;»,.· ...

.,
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Defendant
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an~

Ap~J..!lnt.

•

·~{

\ ..,.; ,,
·. "

•

't·~·/.

·.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'I'ABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

J.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT BY COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

ti

POINT I
'rHE 'rRIAL COURT' s FINDING 'L'HAT PLAINTIFF
WAS EXCUSED FROM HAVING TO COMPLY WITH
THE SPLIT STOCKPILE PROVISION IS ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND IGNORES THE
FACT THAT PLAINTIFF FIRST BREJl.CHED THE
CONTRACT • • • • • • • • • • •
• • 6
POINT II
THE JUDGMEN'I' IS INCONSIST:CNT AND

CCN'l'R?.u.~Y

TO LAW SINCE RESPONDENT WAS GUILTY OF THE
FIRST BREACH, OR UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
ELECTION OF REMEDIES THE ACTIONS OF THE
JOINT VENTURE PARTNERS AFTER THE ALLEGED
BREACH CONSTITUTED AN ELEC'rION TO CONTINUE
PERFORMANCE AND RESPONDENT HAS BREACHED
THE REVIVED CONTRACT •

18

OVERVIEW • ,

l<l

• • • •

}\..

F'IRST BREACH

B.

ELECTION OF REMEDIES

C.

INCONSISTENT JUDGNENT

•.

19
• 19
21

POINT III
TI!F. AWARD OF ANTICIPATED PROFIT IS EX-·
CESSIVE AND CANNOT BE SUPPORTED IN THE
RECORD AND REFLEC'.l.'S PREJUDICE BY THE
COUR'J'. • • . . • • • • • •. • • • • • '

• 25

-.i··
ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~OINT

IV

TIIE .'\WARD OF GENEIV"'\L DAlll\GES IS NO'r
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, IS EXCESSIVE AND REFLECTS PREJUDICE BY
THE COURT . . . . . . . • • . . . .

. ..'

]~

POINT V
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
COURT' 8 AVJ.'\RD FOR VARIOUS OT:1ER
ITEMS IN THE JUDGMENT AND FUR'.i'HER
1'HE COU~T Is REFUSAL ro ALLOW CERTAIN
OFFSETS IS CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE.
.,

....

A.

..... .

'Ji

OTHER ITEHS NOT SUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE • • . . •

. Ji

(1) COST OF WATER
(_2)

SALARIES TO KEY PERSONNEL

l3)

RESTORATION OF PRICE
REDUCTION

(4)

(5)

B.

••

EQUIPMENT RENTAL PAID
1'0 OTHERS

, 41

' '4)

'41

BITUMINOUS PAVING DONE
AFTER BREACH

. .

• 44

OFFSETS NOT ALLOWED

'46

CONCLUSION
CASES CITED
Blair, et al., v. U.S. for Use of GregoryHogan, et al., 147 0.2d 840 • .

• '41

Bomberger v. M~Kelvey, 35 Cal.2d 607, 220
p. 2d 729 (1950) • . . . • • • • . •

'31

~reen v.

• 20

Palfre~nan,

109 U. 291, 166 P.2d 215

Hadley v. Baxen':1cale_, 9 Exch. 3'11, Eng. Rep.

--IT854) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . '36

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided-Hby the Institute of Museum and Library Servi
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Hurwitz v. Davic.1 K. Richards C0rr.E~!::J'> 2C Ut. 2d
232, 436 P.2d 794 (1968) • • • • . . ;
Jameson v. Wirtz, 396 P.2d 68

(Ari~ona)

• • 19, 20, 24

• 20

Lake v. Hermes Associates, 552 P.2c.1 126 (1916)

13

Lowe v. Rosenloff, 12 Ut.2d 190, 364 P.2d 418

14

Monter v. Kratzers Specialty Bread Company,
29 Ut.2d 18, 504 P.2d 40 (1972). . . • • •

• • 34

Nationcl Surety Corp. v. Christiansen Brothers,
Inc.,
29 Ut. 2d 460, 511 P.2d 731 • • . • • • • • 10
Newark Slip Contracting Co., Inc. v. N.Y. Credit
Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 186 F.2d 152
• • 22
Pacific Coast Title Insurance Co. v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co., 7 Ut.2d 3/7, 325
p. 2d 906 • . • • • .
• • • • • • • • • • • • • 37
Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co.,
35 F.2d 301 (1929)
• • . •

24, 24

Schepf v. McNamara, 354 Mich. 393, 93 N.1'1.2d /.30

22

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Midwest Realty &
Finance Co., 544 P.2d 882 (1975)
• • • • • 13
TREATIES

CITED

17 Arn.Jur 2d 989 (Section 441, Contracts)

• • 15

1/ Arn.Jur 2d 807 (Section 336, Contracts)

16

17 C.J.S. 657 (Section 472(1), Contracts)

19

Corbin on Contracts (Section 10J7"Expenses
of Litigation")
• • • •

• • 35

CITATIONS TO STATE OF UTAH STANDARD
SPECIFICATIONS FOR ROAD AND BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION
~970 EDITION (EXHIBIT D-2)
Section 101

• • 29

- Definitions

Section 104. 02 - Altera.tion of Plans or Cha!."<irt2:::·
..
of 1i0:ck

.. ........

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-iii-

Section 105.01

-

2\uthority of the Engineer

Section 109.04

-

Extra and Force i\ccount Work

Section 601. 01

-

Mobilization Description

Section GCll. 02

-

Mobilization Basis of Payment

'

l''I

. ]'
• i'1

.

~l

nsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Serv
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-ivMachine-generated OCR, may contain
errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----00000----

INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION,
INC., a Nevada Corporation,
and PRITCHETT CONSTRUCTION
COHPANY, a Joint Venture,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
Case No. 15167

vs.

STATE OF UTAH, by and
through the DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant and
Appellant.
----00000----

BRIEF OF APPELJ..ANT
----00000----
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This case arises out of the alleged breach ofa
road construction contract by the 7\ppellant with a clai:i
for dc.mages including anticipc>.ted profit under an antic:patory breach of contract theoL·y by Res;::ionde!1t.

llppefa

alleged that F.espondent first breached the contract and.
liable to Appellant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The ::rial court,

the Honorable J. Harlan Burns,

breached the contract and that said breach was
anticipatory in nature.

mat~i~q

'I'he court deterrnir;ed ·aillilages, i·!
i

eluding loss of profit in the total sum of $1, 346, 754.l',I
and awarded same on the 25th day of March, 1977.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON .l\.PPEAL

Appellant seeks the following relief on appeal:
i

1.

A dctern1ination that Respondent first breache'I

the contract and judgment for damc:ges resulting thereiro:1·
·
t
agains

R~span.en
d
t or,

·
th
in
1e alternative, an order rem:.

ing the case to the trial court for a proceeding to dete.
the

d~~ages

due by Respondent; or,

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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2.

For an order determining that the ~ctions

of the Joint Venture Respondents subsequent to the alleged breach of the contract by Appellant on September
26, 1975, constituted an election of remedies to proceed
with performance of the contract and that the subsequent
refusal of Respondents to perform is a breach of the
contract by said Respondents; or
3.

For an order determining that the damages

awarded by the trial court are excessive and should be
modified by the deletion of all the alleged anticipated
profit, rental of equipment from and after October 24,
1975, deletion of general damages, deletion of the cost
of water, salaries to key personnel, restoration of price
reduction for paving done after the alleged breach; or
4.

For an order modifying the judgment by the

allowance of additional offsets for uncompleted contract
items; or
5.

For an order awarding Appellant a new trial

for the reason that the trial court committed substantial
errors which cannot be corrected without a new trial.
FACTS
The parties entered into a contract for the construction of a segment of I-15 in H:i.llard County from North
Holden to Scipic on the ll"'.:h day uf September, 1974.

(Exh.
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"'--ll)

L

*

In the spring of 19 ·; 5, qu12s Lions urose r.:on-

c:c~·ning aggregate stc:cagc for

paving mj.xc3.

later use in bituminous

'";:>pellant' s Project Enc;ineer notified R•·

spondent by letter on Mav 6,

1975

"

(Exh

D-5)
•

'L-h•• -h ee::
·,._l (..

::.

56 and 57 of the special provisions of the contract
which require separate siz2d aggrc:gate wore controllinq
spcncent replied on I·la.y 8, 1975
55 of the provisions.

(Exh. D-7)

(Exh. D-6) and cited

s-.j

I

The Appellant's reply on May 12,

expl2ins that sheets 56 and 57 of the provid

I
<:ir2

not influenced by sheet 55 which pertains to dryer-:j
I

mixing.

This letter concluded by stating: "You are rec.~

I

r:o comply with t:l1e directions covered by these sheets.'

5G and 57.)

Subsequently, on May 14, 1975, Respondent:.j

a letter (Exh. D-·8) to Appellant's engineer outlining

LI

contractor's objections to the specified method of aggri·

1

gate storage and requested the engineer to permit Respor:
to use an alternate method under the provisions of S~L

.I

108.05, Paragraph 7 of the Standard Specifications, I~I
which allows for changes under certain conditions.

~

pellant's engineer responded 11ay 16, 1975 (Exh. D-9) tha:
he "lacked the 2uthority to change specifications b~'
forward the requf"s t. "

*

On May 2 8,

19 7 5, each of the parl

This cc.se w.?.s ti.!:u:ccated for trial.
'l'h12 record for/:
part of the tria.l be.gins wit.h Pa9e l.
To avoid
references to th<:> rcccrd of the first phase of the
.
..
have the nlL'Tlber 1 immedia
t:ely fol lowJ· ng t h e Page refe:·i·
a number 2 irrL'lledi.at.ely followin9 the pnge refer1~~~ ·
co.tes the seco11d phase of the trial in July of
·

co\:;

l
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originated letters to the other concerning the aggregate handling.

Appellant's letter (Exh. D-1) stated that it preferred

the contractor to follow the specifications and that if they
were to be relaxed it would require an appropriate price reduction.

The Respondent's letter (Exh. P-2) stated that the

Respondent would produce three stockpiles of aggregate of different sizes.

Appellant's engineer sent a letter to Respondent

on June 4, 1975,

{Exh. P-3) approving the proposal contained in

Respondent's letter,

(Exh. P-2) and stated that the proposal

*

"meets the intent of the specification."

Respondent began

the production of bituminous paving material on September 18,
1975.

(R. 88)

1

At that time, Respondent had only one aggregate

pile located at the plant site.

(R. 104)

1

Two piles of aggre-

gate containing coarse and fine aggregate respectively, were
located approximately ten miles away at the other end of the
project.

(R. 105)

1

On September 23, 1975, Appellant's engineer

notified Respondent by letter (Exh. P-5) that the location of
the three piles was contrary to the Special Provisions and
Respondent's proposal.

He directed the Respondent to ''sup-

ply two or more stockpiles at the plant site."

Respondent

did not provide the piles as directed, and on September 26, 1975,
the Respondent was handed a letter dated September 25, 1975,
(Exh. P-6) which stated in pertinent part "that the Respondent
would not be paid for noncompliance bituminous surface course,"

*

The Special Provision (Exh. D-4, sheet~ 56 and ?7l r7quir~d
that aggregate be stored in separate piles.of d7ffering.s7ze
and that this material be fed from these piles in the mixing
process for better control.
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allegedly since it did not

I

comply with ~i~ letter of May I

28, 1975 (Exh. P-2) or the special provision.

Responden!i
I

thereafter terminated operations.

Following

of discussion (R. 122, 129-131) 1 and exchange

a brief Per;i
of correspo::i

ence, (Exh. P-6 and D-3) the Respondent commenced a lawsuil
on October 1, 19 7 5.

Subsequently, the Respondent, on or I
I

about October 31, 1975, completed paving the northbound
lane in the vicinity of the Scipio ·Summit so that traffic
could be detoured onto said northbound lane.

The other

joint venture partner, Pritchett Construction Company,

Ci:

tinued performance from the 26th day of September 1975 to
January, 1976, without interruption.

(R. 135)

1

Respondent

Industrial Construction, Inc., prior to resuming operatic·
in October of 1975, notified Appellant in writing (Exh. i
that it was returning to work "solely in order to protect
the work performed to date." (Finding of Fact No. 24) App!:
lant responded by letter, stating that it considered Indu,
Construction Co. and Pritchett Construction Company
contract.

(P-10)

The Respondent, Pritchett

b~unal

Construction~

pany' did not at any time inform Appellant in writing tha!I
its performance after September 2 6, 19 7 5, was in any way
ditional.

t

It allegedly informed Appellant verballyofW

Subsequent to September 26, 197 5, the Respondent Industri·
Construction, Inc., kept equipment and some operators ana

-5ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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supervisors in a standby status pending a resolution of
the impasse between the parties.

At the conclusion of

the work in October, 1975, Respondent Industrial Construction, Inc. suspended operations.

No

further work

was accomplished by Respondent, Industrial Construction
co. thereafter.

Pritchett Construction Company

until January, 1976.

~orked

The issue of liability was tried

to the Court, Judge J. Harlan Burns, beginning March 25,
1976.

Subsequently, the Court ruled that a breach of

contract had been committed by Appellant.

The issue of

damages was tried thereafter in July of 1976, and after
submission of briefs and further argument, judgment wc:s
entered on the 25th day of March, 1977, for the sum of
$1,346,754.59.

Appellant filed its appeal thereafter.
I

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
WAS EXCUSED FROM HAVING TO COMPLY WITH
THE SPLIT STOCKPILE PROVISION IS ERRONEOUS
AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND IGNORES THE FACT
THAT PLAINTIFF FIRST BREACHED THE CONTRACT.
The contract between the parties contained a
special provision (Exh. D-4, Pages 56 and 57) which in
essence required any prospe~tive bidder to separate the
gravel aggregate into two-or more piles of differing sized
cor.iposition.

The intention of the specification is to

guarantee a more positive control of the material going

nsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Serv
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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into the bituminous mixer to in turn get

product of

u

more consistent grada.tion.
Th2 contract also

cont-c~i· ned

.. --'

an ".cep
-c
t·ance pre.

vis ion regarding gradation and bitumen content at t~
point of placerr.ent on the highw2y grade.

This provish

further established a method of accepting material at

a

reduced price when the mix was not fully acceptable but,
1vi thin certain allowable tolerances.

(Exh. D-4, pp. 40-

The evidence shows that between September

u, ~
I

and September 25, 1975,

the contractor produced 9,865,q

of "bituminous surface course 3/4" maximtLn.

(Exh. D-11)

this sum, 3,250.75 tons were accepted without a oricenr
tion and 6,615.20 tons were accepted with a. pricco reduc:f
The evidence further shows tbat at the time
paving began, Respondent had constructed one pile of a1cc
I

gate at the site of the hot mix plant and had screenedtt
I

ditional piles of material which contained material e1f
larger than that which would pass a No.

I

1 screen (4 ope:~

1

I

per square inch) or all of which would pass

throu~a~
I

4 screen.

These piles were loca'ced at the other end oi·
1

job some ten miles away.

(R.

6'.i) ·• Respondent asserts'

1
complied with his letter of May 2 8 , 19 7 5 ( R. 2 3 5) and L
1,

asserts that the special pro·Ji::>lon (Exh. D-4, pp. 56,571"·
specify that the piles must be located at: the s1· t e oft!
mix plant.
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The evidence at trial essentially was to the
effect thut with continuous mix asphalt plants the only
method of controlling aggregate gradation was in the feeding process.

The splitting of the aggregate enables this

to be accomplished by adjusting the feeding of aggregate
from separate piles.

(R. 230)

1

The Respondent contended among other things that
it:

(1)

had a different type of plant and thus should be ex-

cused from the aggregate specification; or (2) that it had
received verbal assurance from State representatives that
it would not have to comply with that provision.
As to the first point, the evidence shows that the
plant is a continuous mix plant with some modifications.
29-30)

1

(R.

There did appear to be a capability of removing some

of the finest sized material.

(R. 29)

1

Notwithstanding this

evidence, Appellant submits that a careful reading of the ag1
gregate storage provision (Exh. D-4, pp. 56, 57) and a com1
parison of the evidence (R. 29-31) shows that the plant in
question was not unique enough to be excluded from the type
of plant which the specification was written to cover.
As to the second point, the trial Court has ruled
that the Respondent "was reasonably led to believe that an adjustment would be made in the provisions of said construction
contract so as to eliminate the use of the split stockpile
method in Respondent's production of bituminous surface course
material."

(Conclusion of Law No. 2)
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While ordinarily an nppellant cannot

properly I
rais2 a factual issue on app2ul, it is submitted thati:.:
this instance the facts should bE~ reviewed carefull

y,

,.·
•!1

'

they demonstrate th2 fallacy of the Court's conclusion,,!
factually and legally.
The alleged "adjustment" in the; split stockp;,
method results from

a

conveL·sation bc;l:'.;een Lalif£

tiff's owner and C. V. Anderson, Appellant's
tor.

\'/ood,:(

assist~t~

Wood's version of the conversation (R. 39-4l)lis•l

the conversation occurred prier to the submission
on the day of the bid opening.

(June 20, 1974)

version is that it occurred at a later date.

of aJ

Anderson'

1
(R. 421) c

struction commencer] in July of 1974, and ::10t until Marc:1
19 7 5 did the dispute concerning aggregate storage surfac'
1

(R.

41, 42) 1
The facts show that in July of 1974 at the ti.r:!

the preconstruction conference, the "split stockpi~~~
was d:i:scussed.

During trial, a transcription of the discu!'

was placed in evidence.

(Exh. D-19)

t
·
was correc_.
th e t ranscript

Laliff Wood a dm,1' t"l
,e:,

219) 1 '1'l1e significant po::[

(R.

is that at no time during this conversation dealing with'
provision in issue was anything said about Respond~t~
exempt from that provision and/or ind12ed asserting that
conversation with Anderson .had-

l•

n fo.ct occ11rred, which if

is to be believed, was only a few days previous to

the prec·
I

I

struction conference.
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Not only is there a dispute concerning the date
of the conversation, but the substance of the alleged conversation is disputed.

(Compare R. 39-41 with R. 416-421). 1

It is, however, Appellant's contention that the
Court's conclusion regarding the non-application of the split
stockpile provision because of the alleged assurance apparently
arising from a conversation prior to bidding is erroneous and
contrary to contract law in any event.

If the conversation

did in fact take place on the day of the bid, then it should
be considered as merged in the contract.

In the case of Na-

tional Surety Corp. v. Christiansen Brothers, Inc., 29 Ut.2d
460, 511 P.2d 731, it is stated:
Where par~1es engage in negotiations
concerning a transaction pursuant to which they
enter into a written contract, it is presumed
that all matters relating to subject are merged
in and constitute a complete integration of their
agreement.
The contract does not in fact recite that Respondent could
ignore the provisions of sheet 56 (Exh. D-4) or that they
did not apply to him as Respondent alleged and the trial
Court erroneously found.
The real question, i t is asserted, is rather what
did Respondent's proposal as contained in the letter of May
28, 1975 (Exh. P-2) obligate Respondent to do and has Respondent breached that obligation?
Appellant submits that everything which occurred
prior to May 28, 1975, is moot, including alleged assurances

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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regarding the nonapplication of sheets 56 dnct 57

to Respondent, if that letter in fact constitutes a nPw
- Pro-

posal.

!

Appellant submits that the letter has to b
e re,:a

in the context of correspondence and contractual provisi,::'
as well as discussions which either existed or occurred
prior thereto to ascertain the intent of the proposal,
I

is therefore clear that Respondent, having been informE,ij

the requirement to split the aggregate and knowing thi;,j
i
Appellant's inherpretation of the contract provision, 'i:o:I
I

making a proposal to compJ_y by constructing "three pile!,

'

one plus 4, one minus 4, and one of "natural material.' 1
I

Read in the context of sheets 56 and 57 of the contract
specL:il provie:ions

(Exh. D-4),

this clearly meets the

j

ii:!

of that provision.

I

The Respondent asserted and the trial

~ourt er:l

ously accepted the point that "neither the original spec.
ti on nor the mod if ica ti on contained any requirement as

ti

where the three stockpiles were to he located." (F indin~ j

I

Pact No.

4)
Appellant concedes that the language of

provision (Exh. D-4, Sheets No. 56 and 57)

~oes

i
the wt

not 3pecr

cally require that the separate sized agsregate be stor:'I
the plant site, nor does Respondent's letter of May 28,
(Exh. P-2)

!

While it is true that the exact langua~~

exist in either Exhibit, Appellant asserts that

anyone o:
I
!
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mon intelligence would obviously assume that

11

competent

contractor would locate the sepa.rate sized piles at the plant
site.

The intent of the specification is obvious from the

language.

In sheet number 56 (Exh. D-4) it states, "The minus

4 aggregate shall be fed to the drier at a uniform rate.

11

Since the mix cannot consist of only minus 4 aggregate, it follows that a pile of plus 4 aggregate is required and it is beyond belief that a contractor will locate that at another location and haul it in for every mix.

This language certainly

implies that the stockpiles will be located at the plant site.
If in writing the letter of May 28, 1975,

(Exh. P-2)

Respondent knew or intended that Appellant would be misled
into believing that it intended compliance with the split stockpile method while intending all along not to comply, then Respondent is guilty of fraud.
dated June 4, 1975,

Appellant's letter of acceptance,

(Exh. P-3) shows that Appellant understood

Respondent's letter to mean compliance "with the contract specifications as bid."

Respondent's silence thereafter is further

evidence of its apparent intent to mislead Appellant into believing rtespondent intended compliance.
Certainly, Appellant understood the letter to mean
compliance witl1 the specifications of the contract.
rejec~ed this in its finding.

That is patent error.

The Court
This

Court has recently spoken concerning ambiguous documents in
the case of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Midwest Realty & Finance
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~~~.'

SH P.2r:1 fl82

(1975), when~in it is stated:

. In dealin~ with a document whi~
'?1'1ll1.r1uous or uncertain.. l:!1e <Jeneral rule is:·;
:tt should be construed strictly against t' ;l
l
.
I" d
he,
wru t e.it
.r'.l we~t)an~ fa:-•orablytothe~·
pc.rty ag <LLn st •:,·horn J. t is invoKed (Wells p ;
., . th
h
d
.
argc.
1< L~1: .. e~,
w er. a
acumen t is of f_hat character,j
tnc Lcial co ..irt can take extraneous eviden ··'
l
1
L
t"1 circumstances
.
Cti
- OQ,-C c_O • i,C tota
to determine,
the parties should reasonably be deemed tor.of
'..lndccstood thioreby.
Th~:se principles are to!
co~.siden:d together_ w~ ~l:. this ~ur~her propos:I
that: where c:bcre 1va:o a:ts(:itJte, it is the pren
of ti.'e trial court to determine whose evidenc
will believe.
·

"':o

How can the correspondence be looked at objectively anii
language be

;i,,;

sco:-istrued?

It is obvious from Appellan:I
I

letter of June 4, 1975,

(Exh. P-3)

that it believed Re:

in t'2nded to comply with the intent of the specificatiQ[
lippellant sub:ni ts the trial Court has interpr
the specifications and the correspondence related
properly.

ili~

Appellant request~ that this Court~~~wL

documents o.nd c:orrect the error of the trial Court.
This Court has recently stated that this pro;
action is appropriate in the case of Lake v. Hemes~
552 P.2d 126

(1976) wherein it is stated:

• The defendant places reliance on·
standard presumptions o~ credibility and
to be accorded the find7ngs and JUdgme~t oat;
trj al court.
However, in a case of this n
· .
~
dep ·
where the resolution o..: the controversy the,
upon the medning to be given documents, , ;
;::curt is in no more f,'lvored position and is:
.
· g of sucn
•
better able to deterrrune
the meanin
5
documents than is ti1 is court.
Therefore, a.
•
.
•
clo not app.
such an issue, tnose pres•Jr.iptions
2 ~~:
[Citing Burns v. s:<ogstad, 69 Idaho 227,
765 (194-9) J

v;:::
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Operations com~enced on September 18, 1975, and
continued on September 19 and September 22.

On September

23, 1975, Appellant informed Respondent by letter of its noncompliance with its proposal of May 28, 1975.

(Exh. P-2)

This letter also points out the failure to comply with special
provisions covering sections 403 and 407.

(Exh. D-4)

This

letter further directs Respondent to supply "two or more stockpiles at the plant site."
Appellant submits that the foregoing facts and evidence show a clear breach of the contract by Respondent, either
of the special provision contained in sheet 56,

(Exh. D-4) or

as.,uming that provision of the contract did not apply due to
verbaj_ assurances, then of the su.bseql.lent proposal of M=.y 28,
1975,

(Exh. P-2) submitted by Respondent.

In either event,

Respondent was clearly in breach of the contract or his own
proposal prior to any breach by Appellant arising out of the
letter of September 25, 1975.
The case of Lowe

(Exh. P-6)

~-Rosenloff,

12 Ut.2d 190, 364 P.2d

418, is a case involving suit by an administrator of a deceased
subcontractor to recover money allegedly due on a subcontract
and damages.

The Court states the following rule:

. • • It is an elementary priciple of the
law of contracts that in order to recover upon
a contract, the contractor must first establish
his own nerformance or a valid excuse for his
failure ~o perform. (Citing authorities including
A.~.Jur.) Since plaintiff failed under the uncontradicted proof to complete the work he.;ontra;:ted to
do, without valid excuse for such fai~ure, ne was
entitled
no for
judgment
against
ponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.to
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The same reasoning should ,1rply in this
that the Respondent contractor in o1_- ~~Pr to c;,"
a brc;:ich of contract must first dcmonC'trate th~t he : .j
1

·1

self he.s not,

in fact, breached the contract.

The facts as c 3. ted above th ::t t be tween Sept;::
18, 1975 ancl September 26, l975, the r_·ontractor prccr_,:
9,865095 tons of bit-uminous surface course, and of
6, 615. 20 tons were subject to a price reduction since:!
did not co:nplet~ly meet the specifications i_ndicate a
lem.

1

While i t is true the contract allows ror accepk,

of rnilterial at a reduced price which is close to beir.oj

specification, the intent was not to pee-mi t a contrac::
continually
D-11 and R.

~roc~uce

ma.terial r.ot in full compliance. 1:

l

323)- It is designed to assist with payner.:

a contractor at a lesser price on those few o:::casions·:
the full specifications are

~ot

met.

(R.

323)

1

Here,:

thirds of tho product in the first seven days' operati:·
to meet full compliance.

It was thus apparent that a -

p.coC!uct could not be con sj s ten tly produced
fourth production day.

a~

early

asll

':'he contractor 1-1as dnected oi

tember 23, 1975, to comply ·;1ith the specification aS!'
'
'
written or with
his
own a 1 ter.na t e proposa 1 of May 28,
(Exh.

P-5)

r\

' J

1\ppellant further submit:s th~ following sta•,
froi•\ 17 .'un.J•.ir.2d 989, Section
point:

~41

on contracts as beir.:t
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• • • It is held that a party who seeks to
recover damages from the other party to a contract for a breach must show that he himself is
free from fault in respect to performance of a
d~p~ndent promise or counter promise, or a condition precedent.
1\.s a matter of fact, what we have here is a c:lassic
case of "first breach."
stated in 17

A.~.Jur.2d

'I'he general law in this area is well

807, Section 366 under contracts, as

follows:
. . • As a rule, a party first guilty of a
substantial or material breach of contract cannot
complain if the other party thereafter refuses
to perform.
He can neither insists on performance
by the other party nor maintain an action by the
otheY party for a subsequ.eP-t failure to perform.
At least the party first committing a substantial
breach of the contract cannot maintain an action
against the other contracting party for a subsequent f<dlure to p8rform when the promises are dependent.
It has also been said that where a contract has not performed, the party who is guilty
of the first breach is generally the one upon whom
rests all the liability of the nonperformance.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Under the rationale of the authorities cited, and
in view of the facts which exist in this case, it seems clear
that the first breach was the failure of Respondent to comply
with the specification or his alternate proposal.
letter of September 23, 1975,

Appellant's

(Exh. P-5) and Respondent's con-

tinued refusal to comply with the engineer's direction to provide at least two stockpiles at the hot plant site,
constituted a breach of contract.

(R. 673)

1

Under the doctrine of first

breach, this would make the alleged breach on the part of Ap-

-16-
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i

I
sincrc> Respondent is legally
prevewl
··1

from enforcing the contract under the authorities
his own "first breach."
Conceivably, there could be a que3tion
the engineer's authority to so order the

location~~;

stockpiles as sci: forth in his letter of September 2J, ,;
(Exh. P-5) 'lnd prior verbal dirGctions.

(R. 673) 1 On''i

''I

iosi

point the Court's attention is invited to Section
the Standard Specifications

(Exh. D-2), which states

tinent part as follows:
. The Engineer will decide all quesL
which may arise as to the quality and accepta:.
of matericcls :EurnishGd anJ work performed ana
the rate or progress of the work; all questic"
\·!hich 'noy ,,,,; se as to the acceptable fulfillE
of the contract on the part of the contractor.
Qui i:e i::learly Appellant's engineer considerea·
absolute failure 0£ Respondent to follow the provisions
sh.:eets 56 and 57

(Exh. D-4) or his own letter of May 11,f

as the cause of the problem which results in a
the quality standards of the c.ontract.

.

failure'~
.

Appellant submits that an objective review

,.1

d

contract documents, the correspondence in eviden~whl~
cited herein, and r~he testimony in evidence as well as!tinent legal authorities, derr,onstrates that the Court's.
cannot be legally sustained and,

that in fact the ~ijr

was legally in breach of either the contractorhisoiiTI'
nate proposal prior to September 26, 1975.
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II

THE JUDGMENT IS INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY
TO LAW SINCE RESPONDENT WAS GUILTY OF THE
FIRST BREACH, OR UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
ELECTION OF REMEDIES THE ACTIONS OF THE
JOINT VENTURE PARTNERS AF'TER 'l'HE ALLEGED
BRF.ACH CONSTITUTED AN ELECTION TO CONTINUE
PERFORMANCE AND RESPONDENT HAS BREACHED
THE REVIVED CONTRACT.
OVERVIEW
Appellant submits that a careful review of the
documents in evidence make it abundantly clear that the Respondent Industrial Construction, Inc. first breached the
contract and that the subsequent breach

o~

the contract by

Appellant, if in fact there was a breach, is the ultimate
responsibility of said Respondent.
It is further submitted that the actions of both
of the Respondent joint venture partners subsequent to the
breach determined by the trial Court constitute an election
to proceed with performance of the contract and that Respondent's subsequent refusal to perform after it had returned
to work is a breach of the revived contract.
Appellant further submits that the Court's award
of amounts over contract prices for work done by Respondent
Industrial Construction, Inc.

after the date of the Court

determined breach is inconsistent and reflects gross error.
The trial Court has used a contract formula to calculate dam<iges after ruling that no contract existed.

The proper measure
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of damages wo~lrt be the reasonable value of the

'l'V'Otk,

it

damages were due.
These three Points will be treated in t'
.1e fot
sections:
A.

FIRST BREACH

This Point is covered in Section I of this brk
and Appellant incorporates that
B.

arg1~ent

here.

ELECTION OF REMEDIES

Appellant asserts that Respondent's

act~m~

sequent to the alleged breach on September 26, 1975 under
th0 r1oct-.ri.nP this Court annotinced i.n thp case of Hurwitz

David K. Richards Company, 20 Ut. 2d 232, 436 P.2d 794 ii
which outlines three alternatives to one not in breach,··
to an election to continue performance.

The Court in fa:

said, one who suffers a breach can (1) rescind the contu
pursue available remedies;

(2)

treat the contract as bin'

and wil.it until the time for performance and bring action'
breach; or

(3)

sue for damages.

This case is in line wit·!

general rule of law as set out in 17 A C.J.S. 657 [Contrcl
Section 472(1)] 11herein it is stated:
. The party not in default has alter·
native remedies open to him, and he may not pul'
sue all of them; specifically, he may n~tl-,
· ·
b reac h and
at '·
damages as for an c.nticipatory
·~
sume time treat the contract us i.n force. (
phasis supplied.)
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•
This is consistent with equitable principles enunciated
in the case of Jameson v. Wirtz, 396 P.2d 68 (Arizona),
wherein the Court stated:
II

• • Equity abhors forfeiture and
will seize upon slight circumstances to
relieve a party therefrom."
This Court has also spoken in this context in the
case of Green v. Palfreyman, 109 U. 291, 166 P.2d 215, wherein the Court states the following:
11

•
Forfeitures are not favored • . •
every reasonable presumption should be indulged
11
against intention to allow a forfeiture.

Applying the foregoing principles to the facts of
this case it is obvious that Respondent's

~ctions

subsequent

to the alleged breach raise a "presumption" against a forfeiture
and constitute an election to continue to perform.

This is all

the more evident in face of the letter from Appellant, dated
October 24, 1975,

(Exh. P-10) which states in effect that the

contract still exists.

If Respondent was correct in relying

on the letter of September 25, 1975,

(Exh. P-6) as constituting

a breach, then it had the three potential remedies under the
Hurwit~

doctrine, supra.

Under the Palfreyman rule, supra,

every reasonable presumption goen against forfeiture which
was one of the remedies.

It is thus apparent that any act

contrary to forfeiture for whatever alleged spurious reason
should constitute an irr~vocable election.

Respondent's sub-

sequent refusal to perform thus becomes a breach of the "revived contract."
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The Court has erred in refusing to all

ow Appe[.,

I

lant to submit evi' dc•nce
rPgar·'
;ng ·c· \1~
~
-·
u.c
" per.f ormanc'" of bo:.

i

Hesponc1enc :Cndustrie<l Construction, Inc. and Pritchetti
struction Company subsequent to the breach.

The Coott I

listened to _l'(espondent' s evidence al.lout the nat11re of l
1·10rk and its nece,-;si ty according to said Respondent's t'.
(cl..

171-177)

1

The Appellant, however, was prevcntedbyi

Court from showing that i t had in fact made plans to h;:
traffic in an alternate manner and that the work was no:
er i tic al as the Respondent asserted.
point.)

(R. 699--702)

1

(See Proffer on tL!

This evidence would have rebutt'.

evidence of Respondent that the only reason it performci
subsequent to the alleged breach was to avoid "potential
bi1ity."

The fact is, Respondent did nothing

concernin~

h::i.ndling of traffic until he was informed that Appellant
planning to use the ex is ting roadway for traffic.

This'

Motivated Respondent to perform the paving ostensibly ta
i:ect itself but as Appellant's evidence would show, this
not in fact true.
INCONSISTENT JUDGMEN'l'
Notwithstanding the fact the Court has detemi:
that Appellant anticipatorily breached the contract, it.
awarded dc:mages inconsisb;nt with that legal position.
.
· ,
·
·
d addition~ I
Respondent submitted
eviuence
that it
incurre
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costs of $49,554.18 over the amount payable pursuant to
the contract.

Appellant submitted no evidence on this point

since i t considered that performance after an alleged breach
is an election of one of the remedies open to a party, and
by electing this approach compensation should be governed by
the contract.

(R. 48-49)

2

In addition, the Court prevented

Appellant from submitting evidence.

(R. 698-701) 1

Appellant cites the following cases which sustain
its position that work done after a breach is to be paid for
at contract prices and binds

hi~

to perform.

The case of

Newark Slip Contracting Co., Inc. v. N.Y. Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 186 F.2d 152 is one such case.

This case

involved work done by the plaintiff after a failure of defendant to pay which the Court construed as a breach.
tiff wanted to recover additional sums.

The plain-

The Court said the

following:
. . • If one party to the contract continues
performance after a breach by the other he must
continue on the contract terms. [Citing A. 605
(Schlegel v. Bott); 3 Williston on Contracts, Rev.
Ed. § 688, 143 A.L.R. 484, 496-503).
The breach
does not permit him to make a new contract without
the others consent . .
In the case of Schepf v. McNamara, 354 Mich. 393,
93 N.W.2d 230, a case involving breach of contract for hauling
sand after the haul distance was increased, the Court said:
• • . By continuing thus to perform and to
accept payments under it, as above noted, he lost
his right, if any, to terminate the contract and
declare it forfeited.
(Citing ~obinson v. Lak~ Shore
& U.S. Railway Co., 103 Mich. 607, 61 N.W. 1041)
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Lt was appellant's dulv when it d'
.
'
" .
l scov .
breach of the contract-., i'f' lt
· )•~
t h e . ~ppa1cnt
'
t o insist upon a forf0i t.__ire, to do ~o
.
.
.
~
at one.
permi L:tin<; apucdlees to proceecJ 1,,i· t-!1
<
.
·-lle P·'r'
of thE~ con1:r2.ci: it waivc,d d hrecich. Grano;:·:]
~ll_m_ber Co. ·1. SJ i.;ck-l{ress Tie & Stove;~.

·1

L'

79 '

l 43

s . \•I •

58J •

Where thece h2.s been

~I i·: I

. '
il

•·.

material breach

do~s not ~n.Jicate an intention to rr::-;:iudiate,
mainJ.er OJ. th~ ,~ontract, the injured party 'I

genu.i.ne e L~ection either of continuing perforc
or ~f ceasing to r:r:~cforrr..
1'\ny act indicatinc.
i1.n intent to continue will operat0 as a cone:
election, not indeed of depriving hi.m of a .;:I
of action for the breach which has alre~yG
pl~ce, bu: depri'.•ir.g him o~ any excuse for °'·I
pe .. formance on his own pare • . . •
Obviously, the Appellant did not consent toc.:!
contract or increase in cost over contract prices" as ;;j
from 5.ts le>tter fJf Octoh'?.".' 2.<!, 1975.

(E:~h.

0.-:1.0)

l'.ppella.nt sub1ni ts that Rcsi:;onderit' s election :1
the wo:ck after .rece:>iving Appellan+_' s letter of October i
1975

(Exh. P-10)

is an implied acceptance of the:> contra:i

that recovery cannot exceed the amount the contract wou::)
If the trial Court is correct that the contract was bre:'
then recovery should be based on a quantum merui t_ theory, I
on a force account basis whj_ch is the way Respondent's ·j
mony was submitted.

(R. 48-·50) 2

"Fo:::-ce a.mount" is a cd

tual remedy for items not otherwise covered by the cont:
the Court found the contract to be breached.
The Court hRs al so co;,urri tted errol'.' in refusin)j
hold that the perforr.iance by the other P-espondent and jo:·

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-23·Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

venture partner Pritchett Construction Co. (see Proffer of
1
Proof, R. 134-136)
constitutes an election of remedies to
continue performance.

The same arguments which apply to the

performance by Respondent Industrial Construction co. apply
equally to Respondent Pritchett Construction Co. in this
context.

The proffer by Pritchett was challenged and dis-

puted by the witness Jerry Sherman who explained that plans
had been made which obviated the need for the work to be
done as alleged by Pritchett.

(R. 679-685 and Exh. P-27) 1

Appellant submits that performance by either or both of the
joint venture partners following the alleged breach on September 26, 1975, should constitute an election to waive the
breach and proceed to perform the contract, Hurwitz, supra,
and consistent with that election to continue, recovery is
allowed only as the contract provides.
The trial Court has ignored this election, and in
fact has "increased the damages" contrary to the rule set out
in the case of Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d

301 (1929) where the Court said the following:
While a contract is executory, a
party has the power to stop performance on
the other side by an explicit direction to
that effect, subjecting himself to such
damages as will compensate the other part~
for being stopped in the performance on his
part at that stage in the execution of the
contract. The party thus forbidden cannot
afterwards goon,aTid-thereby increase the
damages, and then recover s~ages ~
the other party.
(Emphasis supplied.)
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rl'ho c>ffect o[ the Co•1c t; .s .culina in t)1 1· s
-'

Ccti•

in compensC>ting Hespondc1t for work done after the bre:
in excess of contr~ct prices is directly opposed~~
ruling of the Court in

~~~\_ingha~.

It rcsul t;:; in a~":

crease in ti1e damages," which is inconsistent.

The

lant was dnd is willing to compensate r<espondent at co:.·
tract prices and so advised Respondent prier

tot~~

being accomplished.
III

'l'HE AWARD OF ANTICIPATED PROFIT IS EXCESSIVE AND CANNOT BE SUPPORTED IN T~
RECORD AND REFLECTS PREJUDICE BY THE
COURT.

'l'he trial Court awarded judgment i-n the CJ11oun:!
of $340,025.18 for anticipated profit on the

port~n~

work rem<"ining to be completed at i:he time of the Cour'\
determined breach of contract.in September o~ 1975. ,
were several memorandums submitted to the trial Court

1..

connection with this issue and i t apparently represente.:,

a troublesome issue to decide.

Appellant's positiondu:j

trial, in its memorandums and presently was and is, tha'

1

there was no substantial amount of anticipated profit
remaining in the contract ~t the t:il'1e of the Court's
determined breach in September al 1975.

It is respect·
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fully submitted that a review of the record supports
this contention and quite clearly demonstrates that
the Court's figure is erroneous and cannot be supported
by Respondent's own evidence.
The Court in Finding of Fact No. 33 has found
that there is remaining work to be performed totaling
$1,700,125.93 and has arbitrarily found that twenty percent
of this amount represents anticipated profit.

It is sub-

mitted that this cannot be supported legally or factually
in the record but is simply an arbitrary, capricious determination by the trial Court and ignores evidence before the
Court.
Appellant respectfully urges that this Court examine carefully the pertinent parts of the record which will
be referred to hereafter, and which demonstrate the error
committed by the trial Court.
Before proceeding to examine the record, this Court
should understand that the total dollar sum remaining unpaid
is subject to adjustment based on actual measured quantities.
'I'he original contract amount is a composite figure based on
estimated quantities.
At the time of the alleged breach by Appellant in
Septemb2r 1975, the original contract amount of $6,680,000.00
had been increased by the addition of supplemental agreements
totaling $103,603.56

(Exh. D-77) for a beginning b~lance of
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•
;;6,183,603.56.

"

o"-

. 0 '/

L~

<C )

r

.o,

.,,.,

7 L.;,324.oo:
r
..

been earned and naid,
cxceot
for
,.
_
- · '~pn1'
" ·"l.l.CJ.a t
clnlOUnts

£F:ovidec1 by the cont.cuct.

il.'3

An additi.onal sum of $27..J,000.00

C'

ret·cnt;c

(E:·:h. D-·67, pg.·

(Exh. D-67, •e>g.

l) ,,,

rresenting unpaid mobilization wos also earned but~::
since the contr2ct Frovic1cJ for rc~le0.sc of this a.m,iun:
the percenl:age of completion incr12ased.

The Court ac:i

Respondent's evidence concerning its unurmortized co 3:
pr:oviclin'] water in the cimount of $19,.513.00.

1

(Exh.P·:

Deducting tllP- a.."llounts referred to leave:; a ba:1.ance o:
$2,774,766.56.

This figure includes w0rk to be

acco:.,~

b·; the Rec·pc:indent Inc1.ustrial Construction, Inc., by P::\
ConstructioJc Co.,

d!lci

by various subcc:intractors.

The::!

en subcon trc::ctors to Respond2nt is the mathcnatical

::1

between the subcontract price to Industrial and Indus::!
bid price to Appellant.

The Pritchett work has profiti

which goec; to Pri.tchett:, not Respond2nt.
i

!'.ppellant ::;ubmi ts tr.at t~e evidence shows t'·I
binecl to<:al of subccn tract items and work t:o be done:.
Pritchett totals $561.120.00

(Exh. P-41) less an overd

of $G8,000.00 to Pritchett o:i. estimate No. 16, or a ne:I
of $493,120.00.

This figure as staced

:)'.)Ve
'l .

includes

:I

due Respondent on subcontractor it2'1ls and that figure::i
'"27 '"'-·33 •31
,,,
•

(E' x._
h
P -~'1)
..

Jn .:,0.y
,~.. '.rent, the> remaining:.J
-.
't ;,

clue for compl,~tion of the work .:ir.d contractor prof! ··
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$2,281,646.56.

This remaining figure includes the sum of

$1,073,708.32 for the contract item of asphalt.

Pursuant

to the contract, the contractor was instructed not to inelude profit in this item but was instructed to include
his profit in other items.

(Exh. D-4, Sheet 52)

this amount leaves a net figure of $1,277,938.24.

Deducting
Since

this figure is based on estimated quantities it would be
expected to change based on actual measured quantities but
can be assumed to be fairly accurate except where measurernents may reveal a figure at variance from the above.
In preparation for trial Appellant surveyed the
remaining roadway excavation work and has determined an apparent underrun in excess of 100,000 yards.

(Compare cumu-

lative quantity on Exh. D-69, pg. 2 with estimated quantity
and testimony of James Cox on pg. 247.)

2

The remaining dif-

ference between the original estimate of this item and the
actual paid quantity adjusted by the survey is 432,967 cubic
yards which at $0.92 is $398,329.64.

(See difference be-

tween column one and three and five combined on Exh. D-67,
line A 0060).

2

The witness Hitchcock (R. 109) stated that

they claim no profit exists in this item, but that it can be
completed for the contract price.

Thus, whether it under-

runs or not becomes moot, except that the remaining amount
set out must be removed from the remaining money in the contract_.

In other words, if it fails to underrun and the con-
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tractor

co1~pictc'3

th,c 1,orl< he

by his own cvidc'ncc il: wi 1 l

T~t.:;

1ud

t·hc

co:;t l:irr,

amount,

that much to
'1

l~hc

work.

It i t docs underrun,

:1~ '.vo•1

1

t ~ett~e
~·.

won't incur the cost either.

I

Therefore, dc;cluctir,,

12aves a net figure of $379,603.60.
The~

evidenc~~

further show~:i :-_h·cee items,.

·1

the original propos,·d totJl 1-1hich l',es,)(lr>clent does :I
have any profit in lhom.
..

Item # 2 £'lagging
Item # 3 Pilot car
Item

"

r.·

1,:1

4 Obliteration of old road

-l4
·1~

TOTZ\L

lEXh. D-67, pg. l and pg. 41)

I

'rti.e evidence also

sq

item of granular borLow was replaced with road•:1ay:J
(R.

407-417) 2 This item, althoi.;gh a part of the or:J

posal, has been effectively eliminated and thus lt.oi
for this item should also be c1l'duct:ed since it isd
able to assu:rr,2 th?.t i t will be utilized when the

d

it was designated to be userl has been completed~J
way excava i::i on.

'~he en9ineer has authority to r:iaH

changes without approval of the contractor under

104.02 of the Standard Specific<ltions,

d

(Exh. D-2) j

the i l:eIT. is a "rni!lo.-r i tcr.i 11 u:s C.c _.: inc?d on page

c,

of J

J

D-2.

d

))eduction at thes2 [igc1res c-;h5.cl1 total ,o.
leave a nGt figure of $817,949.85.

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
--2 9-·

In the judgment the Court has awarded certain
sums which were in dispute or which were measured and determined since the lawsuit was fi'led.

Th ese sums may con-

tain profit in them but should not be paid for twice, and
therefore should be deducted.

They are as follows:

Price reduction for non-specification
bituminous paving restored by Court
Clearing and grubbing
Cost of drilling and shooting
Pipe, rip-rap, top soil, etc. enumerated in paragraph 26(d) of Findings
of Fact
Stockpile gravel

$

1,822.37
2,000.00
28,427.45

124,350.94
10,734.00

TOTl\L • •

$167, 344. 76

Deduction of this sum leaves a net figure of
$650,615.09.
Finally, the Court in Paragraph 28 of the Findings
of Fact has determined that the Respondent was overpaid for
certain items by reason of measurements which adjust estimated quantities or the cost of finishing items which Respondent has been paid for but which are not fully completed.
These items are as follows:
Adjustment to Roadway Excavation

$ 61,501.08

Adjustment to Roadway Excavation
for amount paid for as top soil

68,018.82

Stipulated off set for finishing
top soil, clean up, etc.

26,301.48

Offset for embankment finishing

11,055.00
$166,876.38

TOTAL
• by
.•
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$4il3,7:18,71 to co''''' the c.:x;t o;' com[Jlotinr; thn ..
- '·1

and the profit, i( any, c.h .c t~o t~c~;po:1c1c:nt.
1

If the Court could arrive
which App2llant docs not
figure,

b~!ieve

is

~-'Os s ible, the.

not the flgur2 selected by the Court ~u~

one to use

cts

1

a Io.ctor since it would have items •.

1

might contain profit.

l1he witnc~ss Erma Hitchcock testified cc.:.t

1

Respondent's profit in completing v01ious contract 1
cording to their figures.

( Exh. P·· ·l l)

By ;-nathe.:a:.

trapolati.on betwec~n the claimed profit- and the bid·!

Item
No.
45

Item

l>.lllount

------

Untreated base 140,960.7
tons
course

Bid

$ l. 60 $

Cost

ProLJ

.65 $ .fr

3.00

1. 59

L::c

5.00

1. 96

J.::f

5.80

4.05

!Ji

120 tons

:;5. 00

5 .13

Bit. material
MC 70

546.89 tons

10.00

.5 .13

51

De2p pen.
asphalt

17.G tons

25.00

52

Blotter
mah:,:cj<•l

50.0 tons

12.00

53

Surfac0 di tchc~> 32, 5CO ft.

167,7Gl.05
tons

46

Bit. surf ace
course

47

Plant mix seal 16, 000 tons

48

Bit. additive

1280 gal.

19

Bit. material
(sr:cead)

50

. ]')

29.J

4J1'

13.00 12,G: I
9.00

JJ'

o··J

.il

•

"j

'i'O'I'i\L COS'}' !'.>ER RESI'O~;OENT
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If this figure is deducted from the net figure
above of $483,738.71, the anticipated profit would appear
to be $62,963.04, together with the profit in the subcontracted items of $27,338.31 for a total indicated anticipated profit of $90,301.35.
Since Respondent's cost projections would naturally be expected to reflect the most optimistic projections in
favor of Respondent, the reality of a profit to Respondent
by completing the work becomes even more speculative.
In any event, the Court's use of an arbitrary multiplier of twenty percent profit is absolutely unconscionable.
It appears that the Court refused to examine and consider Appellant's evidence, including the exhibit derived by crossexamination of Respondent's witnesses Hitchcock and Wood (Exh.
D-77) in sufficient detail.

Even a cursory review of this

evidence reveals that there simply is not enough money left
in the remaining contract to allow recovery of the anticipated
profit which Respondent claimed and which the Court allowed.
As to where the Court got its arbitrary multiplier
of twenty percent and how it determined the sum to which it
applied, Appellant has no idea.

During the examination of

Mrs. Hitchcock it appeared that the profit margin they were
claiming was roughly thirty percent.

In cross-examniation,

(R. 149} 2 she was questioned on this point since that type of
margin is so excessive it obviously had to be.challenged.
On force accoPnt items an add-on factor is added to allow
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-Co.i:- ovcrhec.c: ;'Ind nrofi·
t-.
.l~
.

Th~rn
(._;
..._

in testimony by Bob RO\v~ey.

\·'~~
H~d

· ·
son-- 1(;, mcn:1on
of ..

...._

CE. 193)

2

!\pDellant's:

randums to the Court attempted to disrlel
that this .i.s a proper

\HY

th~
c

·
n1pres2.

to compute profit, hut the

the Court used a twenty riercent multiplier indicates
Court retained this erroneous impression.
Section lO'l.0 1! of the Stand.:>.rd SpecJ.ficatic
(Exh. D-2) go'1erns force amount payment.

This secti:·i

modified by a srecial provision (Sheet 6, Exh. D-4). I
increased that add-on factor for profit percenta 92 f!.
twenty to thirty percent.

evide~:~

The fact is, as is

the languo.ge of the provisions in questions, that tq
centage is not applied to all factors used to determ::J
force account price.

It is not applied to the equip:!

which is usually the largest factor in the calculatic:~
i t is not a true multi plier.

As

the Court knows,

a

::j

count arrangement is only resorted to when a pri~~1
cannot otherwise be arrived c.t.

It is artificial and:

little relation to reality as far as ccsts of an cverJ
tract.

Appellant suhmi tc; that if this is the justiii:'

for the Court's adoption of the twenty percent

mul~~

I

that the Court has committed obvjous error.

There is-

reason with the evidence that the Court· l!acl in front

J:

·
for the Court to adopt such an ar b itrary
mec· hc1d of der:

·
damages for anticipated profit.

The fi' a.ures
in eviden:·
_

with a little bit of milthematic..il cal.c 11liltion, demonst:1·
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.......i

the fallacy of Respondent's claims to anticipated profit.
(Exh. D-77)
Appellant believes this Court was correct in
the case of Monter v. Kratzers Specialty Bready Company,
29 Ut.2d 18, when it said:
The fact that it is difficult to
calculate damages will not prevent an injured
party from recovery. However, a judgment cannot be based upon mere speculation.
Here the trial Court has obviously indulged in speculation
to determine its award of profit to Respondent without
properly analyzing the evidence before it.

Appellant has

obviously been injured by the Court's actions and is entitled to relief.
IV
THE AWARD OF GENERAL DAMAGES IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, IS EXCESSIVE AND
REFLECTS PREJUDICE BY THE COURT.
The trial Court awarded the sum of $100,000.00 as
general damages in the judgment.

Appellant believes that

this amount is aribtrary and obviously excessive.

Respondent

in its complaint seeks the sum of $100,000.00 and with no
substantial evidence to support the award other than the
testimony of Mrs. Hitchcock to the effect that they were going to incur damages for counsel fees, etc. in a nonspecific
amount,

(R. 82-84) 2 the Court proceeded to award the full re-

quested sum.
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not conb.cst i ng tl1e right of

1

Court Lo award general d~mages, assuming th~ fact~
breach of contract.

ft is f\Jrthcc- c·:ow_:cdcd thctt a C:_

must exercise its judcJment as to whaL is n.!uso,iable:
general damages cannot b:" asccrc:c.ined with great C'':"
What Appellant. is ccncc-rned about, howevc.c, is the:·:
prejudice e::hibited by the Court's ilWard of the enL:i
ed amount rec1L1e3ted by Rcsponde:-it.

If there were

evidence in the record to support an award, it perha ~
be understandable.

It is submitted that there isn::.

stantial evidence in the record regarding <Jeneral
(See R.

82-84 for only testimony in record.) 2
Section 1037, Corbin on Cor-tracts, is enfr:

''Exp:~nses

of Litigation."

This section deals with

the only speci cic i terns referred to by l·'.r;;. llitchco-:::.
reference to "general d=ages."

'l'his section reads

::I

as follows:
If t-he olaL1tiff can show that
deff?ndant 1 s br;a~h" of ccntrctct has caused I:
gatio:-i involving the plaintif c in the pa\-;;•·
af counsel fees, CO'JCt co0c;ts in the amount
the judgment and shows tu.:th,,,r that such .
pen~:iture is .:eascnablc in ar.iou1~t and coul·
have been avcided by him by redsonable a~
dent effort he can recover LiaD-3CJ<-" uga1nst
def9ndant measured by the amount of these
pePdi tu res.
•
It is submitted that thcr'2 is no evidence
(1)

~
ti1e
amount pui'd or

costs or other expense;

+~o

l

tor

b e paJ_"cl ..::cor co11.~sel
fees,·_.,
"
C'\

( 2)

that

tl 1 ~~

,"1nount
cxrJended
··
,
'
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sonable; and finally (3) that the expenditure could not
be avoided by due and reasonable diligence.

As to counsel

fees, the standard was not met and as to the few other
items she listed under this category of damages, there
was likewise no attempt to specify or justify any amount.
In choosing the remedy which was to assert a
breach of contract and to refuse further performance, the
law clearly intends that Respondent reco·v-er for work accomplished to the date of the breach, reasonable expenses of
terminating the contract and in certain instances, anticipated profit.

On the other hand, it does not require that

the party who caused the breach be

"penalized.~

One of the other general damage items raised in
trial

deals with the interruption of Respondent's financing

and the alleged harships suffered as a result thereof.
82-84)

2

(R.

Apparently, Respondent was heavily committed finan-

cially and the delay involved in litigating this matter imposed a hardship on Respondent.
as must be obvious.

Appellant has also suffered

Appellant does not believe that damages

of this nature, real or substantial as they may be, are or
should be cognizable.

They simply are not "foreseeable."

The landmark case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156
Eng. Rep.

(1834) established the rule or concept that damages

must be "reasonably foreseeable" and it has been adopted by
the Utah Court in the case of Pacific Coast Title Insurance
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~'2.:__':'._:_ Ha_:c:!_f_2_r~l1c~~Jdt~r~~~--J:_f1_<~c_n:0i_~_LS:..S:'.:, 7 Ut. 2d lJi,
325 P.2d 906, whercln the Court stated th~tt c,1P1ages
i

..
1

coverable Jre:
. based upon the concept
or- teaso~._
able foreseeability that loss
• \'lOUld rt·
sult fro~ the breach.
1\r:ipellant i.lsserts thi't how a party finance,
operations internally and the possible difficulty
may encounter for this reason in
cut.side t:1c realms of a

3.

hreach of contract:

"foreseeable" damage.

If he

financed his operations without borrowing, then no~
0£ this nature would result.

To require Appellant to

for- Respondent's financing chi«:::ges adds to the diEnigq
is contrary to the Paci£ le Coas L 'Ci tle InO'urance Co.:.
Hartfbrd case, supra / as to foreseeability and also c:"
trary to the genera 1 law which prohibits the party not
breach from adding to the damages.

This point is

by the case of Bomber~12r v. McKe~_vPy,

729

35 cal.2d

I

ill:\

607,.r

(1950) where the Court stated the following:

. . . E:i ther party to an executory con::
has the p0wer to stop ?erfor,11ance on the co::
by givinq notice or d.i_rection to tnat effec::
jtccting hims•.Jlf to liability for dzimages, i:.:
receipt of suci1 notice tiw other party can''.:
tin~e to perfo.1:r;i and .rP.c::iver d2rnages bas~:~j.
pertormance. (C1til'.:1ons or.lltted.) This .. ,.
plic&tion of l he principle that a plaintiti
mitigate d,~,inaqes so far ilS he can without 11
himself.
;
Obviously,

2.

party caus:'ng a breach must

tiie resull~; of that ilction.

lrJ

So cilso must the party.:. ;
I
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elects to stand on the breach.

He should not recover more

than is reasonable and fair to both parties.

To compensate

him for such things as internal financing costs, alleged expenses such as Court costs and counsel fees, etc., under
the guise of "general damages" without requiring the party
to make a substantial effort to support them in the record,
particularly when some of the elements of the so-called
general damages are not legally recoverable, works a "gross
injustice."

Appellant believes that the Court's award of

the entire claimed sum of $100,000.00 as general damages results in a gross injustice to Appellant.

Appellant further

submits that Respondent has not met the burden of demonstrating the fact of general damages, let alone a reasonable
basis for the Court to exercise discretion in awarding any
amount and that the entire amount awarded should be eliminated from the judgment.

THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COURT'S
AWARD FOR VARIOUS OTHER ITEMS IN THE JUDGMENT AND FURTHER THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO
ALLOW CERTAIN OFFSETS IS CONTRARY TO THE
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
A.

OTHER ITEMS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE

Much of the evidence presented by both parties
during the trial dealt with the question of sums due Respondent fur work done to the date of breach.

Closely tied to
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thi:o was the question oi: ot f sc ts due i'1l)l-··.:'1 lant

fo, :.:

partially complete on the date of breach.
Appellant,

in addition to the Court's

a:.ia::
1

anti~ipated profit and general damages refcrrau•
~

to i:.

Section IV of this brief, believes that the Court h··

'"
mitted error in the award of the follm·15.n<J sums:
(1)

Cost of Water

(2)

Salaries to Key Personnel

(3)

Restoration of Price Reduction

( ~)

Equipmevt Rental Paid to Others

( 5)

Bituminous Paving Done l\fter Breach

(Unrccovered drilling cost)

TOTAL .

(1)

$ B, ~
39,,

!,,

191,: I

~.$301,4

COST OP WATER
I

As to the cost of water, this was allegedly
remaining unamortized out of a total su.'11 of
P-52)

$'77,372.~'.

incurred by Respondent accorciing to the testimor.

Mrs. Hitchcock.

(R. 34-39) 2 A];)pellant asserts that th::

is not a separate pay item under the contract and the:•
has to be included in an existing cont:ract pay item,
Court's Attention is invited to the item of mobilizatio
(see Exh. D-2, page 269, Section GOl. 01) ~vhicll reads i:.
tinent part as follows:
Mobilizc1 ti on sha l.l consist of prepar~tor.
·
·
1 u d ing,
·
b t.'t not 11.:n·
work and ope.rations,
..:.nr_;
sc
to those necessary for the movement of per,
I •
,
.
•
_
t 0 the P•,
equJ.pment,
supplies
a:1:1, u_:cidentals
- offit'
ject site, for the est-:iblishment of all
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i

buildings and other facilities necessary
for work on the project; for furnishing
. : . and for all other work and operations
which must be performed, or cost incurred
not otherwise paid for prior to beginning'
wc;>rk on the va~ious items on the project
site.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Appellant respectfully submits that to allow Respondent separate payment for this item will result in double
payment.

It is obvious from the emphasized portion of the

language in Section 601.01, supra, that since the providing
of water is a prerequisite for most items of roadway work,
it must be provided for "prior to beginning work on the various items" and that it is "not otherwise paid for."

If Re-

spondent for its own purposes chooses not to charge this item
to the mobilization item (unbalanced bid) that, of course, is
its prerogative; however, the submission of the bid on the
mobilization item pursuant to the specification presumably ineludes payment for this work and it is improper to accept Respondent's self-serving assertions as the trial Court apparently did that they did not charge the expense to the mobilization item.

(R. 37) 2 The witness Wood contradicted his em-

ployee, Mrs. Hitchcock, in explaining what the bid item of
"mobilization" included and specified "developing water" as
one item.

(R. 196) 2 This is an open invitation to chicanery,

contrary to the contract provision, and in conflict with Respondent's principal officer's testimony.
rt is also beyond comprehension that a contractor
would incur that kind of expense on the front end of a con-
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tr a cl o.nd i:lic:n µro-rc, i~e Uie cus t ove.c l'luLk
knows will not be co~pletod Uil~i ~ nea.c the
tract.

(To-·\·iiL; untrc-,ated base c~our:s'"

realistically will include it

j

dild

l te111s ii'!,

~
en"' oft'

t

µaving,)

n tllc mo bi lizaUon i

kno':ling that ho can r2cover a substunt.i.al portion
expense at an earlier stage.

(S<'e S•cc·::ion 601- • OJ.
- u:. t

269 of Exh. D-2 wherein i t is provided that the

i tern is released in stc,ges as the contract is cornpl::
instance, twenty-five percent completion triggers rc'.j
sixty perc,~nt of the total mobilization i tern.
lvood' s explanation on pages 196 and 197)

See a.

2

t2)

SALARIES TO KEY PERSONNEL

(4)

EQDIPl-!Zi'lT RENTAL l'AID TO O'J'HERS

(5)

BITUMINOUS PAVINS DONE AFTI::R BREACH

As to the salaries of key personnel, eguip·i
rental paid to others and bituminous paving done su0o:j
to the breach,

the .hppellant cites the case of Blair,J

v. U.S. for Use of Greqory-H~C@~ __et_al..'..., 147 F.2d1::1
1

I

wherein the Court j_n conunenting on da!~iages allowable •:I

a breach of a construction contract states the foJlm:q

page 848:
. Expenses incurred by a party i~;'(
paration for performance of a contract ber 0::
its a!Janclonme t by the other party are ~r1~'.:
elements of cl.11~age:: Cc'.used by the breac ..
Co·-:10.n v. Smith, 149 F. 945) and •::ienerally,•
breach of-a constr11ct.i.on contract prevents.~·
rorrnance the damacre:; are ( 1) what is expence.
ts +-hat i
ward the pertormaric2, 'Cnd (:?) pro 1
have been i:-edl ized bv full pe:cformance. ~--:,
~~!::''?.~~--Le':'_~~ ;-i_i_:;_ t. __:'.'.._:_.J'~t;\·l.i,_ 11 iam:.c_ QE..':'.~~~

n

.,

c

0

t0J
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Cir., 40 F.2d 873. We don't see, in the circumstances disclosed by this record, how charges
for ~ent of the machines can be allowed. The
machines belonged to plaintiffs. They were to
be used on the project. Their use on the work
migh~ have produced a net profit.
Whether any
profits would have resulted if plaintiffs had
fully performed is left to pure speculation which
is not sufficient as a basis for damages. U.S. v.
Reha~, 110 U.S. 338; . . . As said by the Supreme
Court in Miller v. Robertson, 26 U.S. 243, 45 s.
Ct. 73, 78, 69 L. Ed. 265:
One who fails to perform his contracts
is justly bound to make good all damages
that accrue naturally from the breach; and
the other party is entitled to be put in as
good a position pecuniarily as he would have
been by performance of the contract.
He is not, however, entitled to better his condition nor to profit by non-performance. We think
there is a logical difference between expenses incurred and an allo~ance for the rent of machinery
not in fact used and there are practical reasons
for allowing the one and rejecting the other. • .
Appellant concedes that a rental expense incurred
for machinery owned by others may be recoverable by Respondent.

However, the rental agreements in this matter were

either "purchase contracts in disguise" or could apparently
have been cancelled at will with no penalty.

(See Exhibits

D-78, D-80, D-81, D-82, and R. 115-121, 488-490.)

2

Appellant

asserts therefore that the crucial question becomes the date
that damages cease to run against Appellant.

When Respondent

elected to adept the remedy of cessation of performance and
to stand on the breach and refuse to perform, he incurred the
duty of mitigating damages at that point.

His failure to act

accordingly does not obligate Appellant to respond in damages.
Assuming arguendo that a reasonable time follows during which
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the parties sc0k for a 1,·ay out of tL0

1~ c

i."lpa:>se it

cci.vable tlktt his fuilurc to .:ict should not ,.nrev ent ,, ,
If indeed this is cor.cect, tlwn Ap;)ella,1t assert::; thl!
spondent's letter of October 22, 197S,

(Exh. P-1) is: I

off date of that "'
neriocl since Mr. \'/uod unequivocally::
·
tlvit "we consider our contract with the State has
mina te•l" on th3. t cla te.

If l\ppellant is correct L1

be~.

t:1:

1

pretation of the law, then thf'> amou;•t .::.1."1c1rdec1 for eqii:
rental is at lest three times whac- «.roulr1
•
- be reasona bl: I
Exh.

The Court awarded damages bu.sed on three r

P-42)

rental.
L!.kewise, the salaries to key personnel shou::1

·.vhat they should be.

(Sec Exh. P-49)

The payment of $49, 559 .18 for paving done aftq

breach is in u.ddition to contract arr,oullts paid and has:j
been cOJrunen ted on in Section I I C.

Resrondent should d

ped from further recovery or the old contract should t0 I
sidered revived by this election of the remedy of proc:j
with peL·formance.

In either event, nroper recovery is:\

tract price, or the reasonable vL1lue. of the work,

not:!

ditional swn which the Court: has awarded for this iten:J
force account.
( 3)

RESTORAT:i:ON OF PD.ICE REDUCTION

Finally, as to the reatoration of th2
cf $1,822.37, Appellant finds this to be one of

price

re:-j

th£

mod
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tasteful acts of the trial Court even though the amount is
somewhat insignificant.

The problem results from alleged

erroneous test information and whether or not the Respondent acted on that information.

The unrefuted testimony

of Mr. Weldon Heaton is that he "caught his own error, tried
to reach Mr. Wood, was unsuccessful, so he drove to the plant
and delivered the corrected report and found that the operator
had not changed the plant settings.

(R. 529) 1

This means no

production deficiencies on that day resulted from the erroneous test.

The price reduction is therefore proper.

He further

testified concerning a conversation with Mr. Wood about this
test result, in which Mr. Wood admitted that the results were
correct,

(R. 5jOJ

1

and the price reduction was proper.

This

was not refuted in the evidence.

B.

OFFSETS NOT ALLOWED

Considerable evidence was offered relating to offsets claimed by Appellant.

Substantial offsets were allowed

by the Court, and certain offsets were stipulated to.

Appel-

lant is concerned by the failure of the Court to grant more
than $11,055.00 for the cost of finishing embankment.

This

sum is the amount Respondent testified it would cost to finish
subgrade.
opinion.

The Respondent's testimony was based mostly on his
(R. 544-551) 2

Appellant is mindful of the fact that

the Court will not reverse the trial Court if there is "substantiaJ competent evidence" in the record to support the trial
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Court's rul.in].
UiSrC:CjLJrd Of the .'\ppelL:rnt IS testlc:
the trial

CoL1 rt, J'-'.)[-'Cll,1r.t sub:nit:3 tlwt the trial Cn

.,

failed to properly ev;1 1_uate the testimony ,rnd has e::
the arr.oun t o t

tLe darnC>'J'' award.

i\pp<:'llcint subn•.ittcd the tccstimony of £lob F:

a project engineer on a project similar in s cop'"
near Beaver and which was being worked at the
the subject project.

(s,,c R.

179-216)

2

a~J

sa~~

llr. Rowley

that actual experience with Respondent indicated

R.

206)

2

td

t~tl

finishing the subgrnde to be $0. 29 per squ;;re yard.
Zil,

:1

q

The sRrne c;quipment, opercitors o.nd supe:··-1

applied to both jobs.

'l'he ·,1itness Jame:; Cox tosti'.kt

the actual required arro;a of refinishing on the subjec:.•
ject was

~91,206

square yards.

(See R.

230)

2

Respor.:

made no effort to snbmic·. the basis for its figu.ce but

0

f

offered the "opinion of Mr. Wood" to sup;:iort the figd
ferred to.

(R. 544-551) 2

At the time of the alleged breach there had L'
1, 000, 000 plus cubic yards of rouJway excavation place:!

D-69,

Page 2)

Some of the grade built with this

plel~e and accepted,

some was not.

iteDJ

Clearly l\ppellant ·-~

I

titled to an offset for t!'le required finishingundert.t
of contract breach.

'J.'h·~' amount claimed by Appellant "',

to ten percent of the tot01.l c:!.pproxir.lately.

rt is supfJ
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by competent evidence, both from the testimony of engineers

as well as documentary, including a series of photographs.
(Exh. D-63, D-64, and D-65)

By contrast, Respondent offers

the naked opinion of the Respondent's chief officer with no
attempt to support this by any calculations, figures or
ing as to how their figure is determined.
in the opinion of Appellant is not tenable.

sho~~

(R. 544-551) 2

This

It does not demon-

strate an even-handed approach to the evidence by the trial
Court.

'I'he contractor should be the best judge of what his

costs are, but that does not excuse him from the requirement
of submitting "competent evidence" based on recognizable factors or standards to support his "opinion."

This he failed to

do.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that there is abundant
evidence of error in the record.

The trial Court formed an

impression very early in the proceedings that Appellant had
breached the contract and seemed unable thereafter to properly
evaluate the evidence during trial.

This pre-judgment mani-

fests itself in various erroneous legal rulings by the Court
which are obvious and in more subtle fashion by the tendency
of the Court to accept Respondent's position over that of Appellant any time there is a conflict in the evidence.
Appellant concedes that the initial reaction of a
layman when presented with the facts surrounding the dispute
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•
which leads to this liU_gation is "1,t1y clof's .1\)pelJant.
sist on a specified n1ethod of agc;cegate pr<"paration ·.;:·,
it would

appe~r

that Respondent can ach1 eve ut i , .
01'->t,,

tial compliance with acceptance s tandard:c: by its own .-,

1

The trial Court obviously could not set aside this
When confronted with the mass of testimony in s11pport:I
validity of the "method specification" the Court c~~
sidestep the obvious conclusion by its finding that
of a verbal assurance prior to submission of its biH~
dent was excused from having to comply.

Appellant b~Li~

this clearly demonstrates how far the trial judge was:::
'I

pared to go to validate his initial conclusion.

The

t't

sue is not vvbat was the pre-bici assurance or even what·
contract itself says.

The :ceal issue is, did Respond;;:

comply with his own proposal regarding aggregate stora·:'
preparation as set forth in his letter of May 28, 19Jl:
proposill was approved by Appellant and it is submitted·
evidence clearly establishes that Respondent never dia:
with his own proposal.

The trial Court, contrary to f

1
••

mental legal principles, fails to construe a docwe~r
the drafter of the document.

It is apparent that Appel

understood the proposal to be that three piles wooN~
to feed the asphalt plant.

It is further apparent that·

spondent knew what Appellant's understanding of iU~~
was and remained silent.

This .ts either fraud by theR'

dent or at the least an ambiguity in construing a docl1''
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which should be construed against the drafter.

The Court

chose to ignore this point.
Appellant asserts that the overwhelming evidence
and conclusion is that Respondent breached the contract first
by failing to comply with its May 28, 1975 proposal and later

the written directive to comply with this proposal by Appellant's engineer on September 23, 1975.
The subsequent failure of the trial Court to find
that the actions of both joint venture partners subsequent to
the alleged breach constitute a waiver of the breach or an
election to continue performance is further evidence of the
trial Court's pre-disposition to find Appellant in a breach.
The trial Court ignored the evidence or refused to hear evidence from Appellant on this point.
Finally, in its ruling concerning damages, the trial
Court again demonstrates that the Respondent's position is to
be accepted over that of Appellant on any disputed point.
This is clearly manifest in the small item involving an alleged erroneous test.

The Court chose to ignore unrefuted

testimony of the lab technician that no change in plant settings occurred and accpeted Respondent's version.

The bias

of the trial Court is equally manifest in the outright rejection of Appellant's argument based on Respondent's own evidence that anticipated-profit could not exceed a figure cf
approxim3tcly $100,000.00 in favor of an arbitrary multiplier
of twenty percent of an assumed figure of work remaining.
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This rnul tiplircr j_s not based on evidence ·i"d
· ..
~
L.1 pat:
<._

arbitrary, ca pr icj ous ::incl demons t.rates an irresp on,_..
dis~·egard

for cl2,1r evidence in the recot·d.
In fairness to the trial Court there was ,.

1
attPmpt to be Cair in other items of damage such ao
·1
mcnt rental Qncl sal.L11:ies to key r_:iersonnel subsequeiq
date of breach.

Appellant submi l:s, ho11'e1·er, that"'

'·I

Court could have resolved this problem easi.i.y by

eq
.. r

the law of breach to the effect t:hat once the elert)
made to stand on the breach, both partic;s have to i:
the result.

Or.e month after the alleged breach occt

Respondent ca.tc;gorically stated there was no contre:·
ing, and this should be the cut-off date.
award for equipment rental,

This mea:.

salaries, etc. is at le;:

times what i t should have been since the Court chose~
i110nth period as the cut--off.

The Court's excessive:l

general damages to the extent of 100% of that cla.foe:
substantial testimony to support the award aga~d~
the Court's strong bias against Appellant.
Finally, the Court's total rej9ction ofAPf'
evidence regarding offsets for fj_nishing the subgraci.
evidence w;:is well docwnented anci supported in favoro:
dent's undocumented self-ser,;ing "opinion," again aei·
the bias of the trial Court.
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Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment
should be reversed and that Appellant should be awarded
judgment against Respondent for its breach of the contract
or for its subsequent breach of the revived contract.

Alter-

natively, Appellant submits that the judgment should be set
aside and the matter remanded to the trial Court for a new
trial.

Finally, in the event this Court sustains the triai

Court in its finding of .a breach, the Appellant- submits that
substantial reductions in the amount of damages are in order
as set forth above.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN, Attorney

Gener~l·

. / /_2~.,,
/ 4:---/i
·-- / ...::- //::-.-r_,('
By -X.;,,c.::_~
/ ,,..- ( ~
//,._.'/ j;
Dl~LAND

• FOED

Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Appellant

CER'l'IFICA'TE OF MAILING
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing
Appellant's Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to John G.
Marshall of Tuft and Marshall, Attorney for Respondent, Goj
East 4500 South, Suite B, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107, this
3rd day of January, 1978.
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